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Abstract
This Note argues that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Section 1782 should become the
standard throughout the federal courts because it applies proper canons of statutory interpretation,
adheres to the U.S. Congress’ intent to provide an efficient means of assistance to participants
in non-U.S. tribunals, and encourages other nations to provide similarly broad discovery requests
when U.S. litigants seek evidence located abroad. Part I discusses the development of judicial
assistance statutes in the United States and sets forth the U.S. congressional intent behind the
enactment of Section 1782. Part I also examines the provisions of the current statute governing
international judicial assistance. Part II analyzes the split within the U.S. circuit courts on whether
Section 1782 contains an implied discoverability requirement. Part III argues that federal courts
should adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning and not read a judicially-created barrier to discoverability into 28 U.S.C. §1782. This Note concludes that the split in the circuit courts should be
resolved in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach, thereby providing non-U.S. parties a uniform
rule for conducting discovery within the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century approaches, the economic and
political interdependence of the nations of the world continues
to grow.' The continual development and expansion of multinational corporations,2 international trade agreements, international financial transactions3 and transboundary criminal investigations4 have precipitated a corresponding increase in interna* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. See RobertJ. Augustine, ObtainingInternationalJudicialAssistance Under the Federal
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters: An Exposition of the Proceduresand a PracticalExample: In Re Westinghouse Uranium
ContractLitigation, 10 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101 (1980) (stating that nations of world
have become increasingly interdependent); Sharon Devine & Christine M. Olsen, Taking Evidence Outside of the United States, 55 B.U. L. Rxv. 368 (1975) (noting increase in
number of contacts between U.S. citizen and citizens of other nations).
2. See Lee Paikin, Problems of ObtainingEvidence in Foreign States for Use in Federal
CriminalProsecutions,21 COLu.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 234 (1986) ("The rise of multinational corporations with branches or subsidiaries in different states, each controlling its
own domain of information, has added a special dimension to (international litigation]."); Henry Harfeild, The Implications of U.S. ExtraterritorialDiscovety Proceedings
Against MultinationalCorporationsfortheJudiciary, 16 N.Y.U. J: INT'L L. & PoL-973 (1984)
(discussing effect of U.S. discovery proceedings on multinational corporations).
3. Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLuM. L. Rv.
1015, 1015 n.1 (1965) (documenting "vast growth of international commerce" after
World War II).
4. See Bradley 0. Field, Comment, Improving InternationalEvidence-GatheringMethods: PiercingBank Secrecy Laws from Switzerland to the Caribbeanand Beyond, 15 Loy. LA
INT'L & COMP. LJ. 691 (1993) (documenting need for improving methods by which
United States obtains criminal evidence from non-U.S. banking institutions); see also
Bruce Zagaris, Developments in InternationalJudicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18
DEN,. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 339 (1990) (discussing significant developments in international judicial assistance due to growth of international narcotics trafficking); RobinJo
Frank, Note, American and InternationalResponses to International Child Abductions, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL 415 (1984) (discussing legal problems involving international
child abductions); Roger M. Olsen, Discovery in Federal CriminalInvestigations, 16 N.Y.U.
J. INV'. L. & PoL. 999 (1984) (examining U.S. procedures for compelling production of
evidence abroad); Serge April &Jonathan T. Fried, CompellingDiscovery andDisclosure in
TransnationalCriminal Litigation: A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pot. 961
(1984) (discussing problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal law enforcement).
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tional litigation.5 The proliferation of disputes involving
governments, businesses, and individuals across national boundaries requires litigants in one country to obtain evidence located
within another country.6 Consequently, the need for more efficient international judicial cooperation has become manifest.'
Government authorities and litigants involved in legal disputes outside the United States often need to obtain evidence
5. See Robert Greig & Walter Stahr, US Discovery in OverseasLitigation, INrr'L FiN. L.
REv., Jan. 1988, at 27, 28 (discussing discovery in United States for use in litigation

abroad); Morris H. Deutsch, Comment, Judicial Assistance: ObtainingEvidence in the
United States, Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, for Use in a Foreignor InternationalTribunal, 5 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. Ray. 175, 176 n.6 (1982) (stating that significant increase of international transactions has had result of increasing incidence of international litigation);
Devine & Olsen, supra note 1, at 368. "The number of contacts between United States
citizens and the citizens of other nations has been increasing rapidly in recent years. As
these contacts continue to increase there will be a corresponding rise in the amount of
litigation in United States courts with international aspects." Id.; Harvey M. Sklaver,
ObtainingEvidence in InternationalLitigation, 7 CuMB. L. Ray. 233, 233 (1976) ("During
the past 25 years there has been unprecedented growth in the United States international commercial intercourse which has taken diverse forms and, not unpredictably,
has lead to increased international litigation."); Edward C. Weiner, In Search oflnternationalEvidence: A Lawyer's Guide Through The United States DepartmentofJustice, 58 No=R
DAME L. Ray. 60, 60 (1982) ("The United States and other countries are increasingly
discovering that their citizens engage in transnational activities that often result in lawsuits. Obtaining evidence from foreign nations is necessary to conduct such litigation.").
6. Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-AeropastialeApplications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 Irr'L LAw. 393, 394 (1990) (stating that
"[i]nternational litigation in U.S. courts frequently requires access to materials or witnesses located outside the United States"). For an example of U.S. prosecutors taking
depositions outside the United States, for use within the United States, see United
States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988).
7. Ryan J. Earl, Note, TighteningJudicial Standardsfor GrantingForeignDiscoverj Requests, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 343 (1993) (stating that growth of complex international
disputes created need for greater international judicial cooperation); see Laker Airways
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
As surely as people, products, and problems move freely among adjoining
countries, so national interests cross territorial borders. But no nation can
expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate,
and enforce. Every nation must often rely on other countries to help it
achieve its regulatory expectations.
Id. at 937; see Harry L. Jones, InternationalJudicialAssistance: Procedural Chaos and a
Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953) (detailing history of international judicial
assistance in United States); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs
of Trinidad and Tobago, 117 F.R.D. 177, 180 (S.D.Fla. 1987) ("In today's world of international crimes and world-wide criminal enterprises, especially in the area of narcotics
trafficking and money laundering, the nations of the world must work together to eliminate sanctuaries for criminal activities and provide the production of relevant and
sought-after evidence needed for successful prosecution.").
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located within a U.S. jurisdiction.' 28 U.S.C. § 1782 ("Section
1782" or "statute") governs the procedures for obtaining
evidence within the United States for use abroad.' Section
8. See, e.g., JUDICLAL PROCEDURES IN LITIGATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, S.
REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782,
3783. "The steadily growing involvement of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation." Id.; see In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1992) (non-U.S. corporation requesting discovery within United States for use in
non-U.S. proceeding); see also Christopher L. Eldrige, FederalJudicialProcedure-Judicial
Assistance-Preservationof the AdjudicativeRole of Letters Rogatoiy, In Re Requestfor InternationalJudicialAssistance (LetterRogatoy)for the FederativeRepublic of Brazi4 936 F.2d 702 (2d
Cir. 1991), 16 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 255 (1992).
During the first one hundred and fifty years as a sovereign entity, the United
States rarely and reluctantly granted judicial assistance. Although congressional enactments existed to authorize federal courts to accommodate foreign
requests for information, there were substantial obstacles and exacting criteria
which curtailed such assistance. In the past five decades, however, there has
been a concerted legislative effort toward facilitating, rather than impeding,
the collection and transmittal ofjudicial information across international borders.
Id. at 259-60.
9. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub.L. 88-619, § 9(a), 78 Stat. 997 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988)) [hereinafter 28 U.S.C. § 1782]. The statute states in its entirety:
[a]ssistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such
tribunals
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a
foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or the other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court.
By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has the power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may
prescribe the practice or procedure, which may be in whole or in part the
practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal,
for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other
thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced,
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.
(b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from
voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or
other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal
before any person and in any manner acceptable to him.
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988).
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1782 establishes the standards by which U.S. federal courts1 °
adjudicate discovery requests from non-U.S. and international tribunals."
The U.S. Congress, when enacting Section 1782, bestowed
considerable discretion upon district courts when determining
whether to compel a witness to testify or to provide information
sought by a requesting party.' 2 However, due to this broad grant
of discretion in Section 1782 the U.S. circuit courts have been
13
unable to provide a uniform response to requests for discovery.
These disparate interpretations cause non-U.S parties' 4 who are
10. This Note is limited in scope to the federal approach toward judicial assistance.
For a discussion on the state court approach, see Jones, supra note 7, at 542-43.
11. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 5, at 175 n.5 (providing example ofjudicial assistance involving international tribunal).
12. See Deutsch, supra note 5, at 178 (discussing wide discretion given to courts in
providing international judicial assistance). "Congress liberalized Section 1782 by
designating a wide range of foreign proceedings as eligible for judicial assistance with
respect to discovery. Congress also granted wide discretion to the judiciary both in
rendering such requested assistance and in allowing the use of foreign procedures in
the evidence gathering process." 1d.; Senate Report supra note 7, at 3788. Section 1782
leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court
which, in proper cases, may refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions
it deems desirable.... The terms the court may impose include provisions for
fees for opponents' counsel, attendance fees of witnesses, fees for interpreters
and transcribers of the testimony and similar provisions.
Id. The wide discretion given to the district courts under Section 1782 has been acknowledged by the U.S. federal courts. See, e.g., In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A.,
794 F.Supp 442, 445 (D. Maine 1992) ("The broadened power of the district courts
under amended § 1782 was expressly designed to make the federaljudicial system more
generous in its assistance to foreign litigation. Both the legislative history and academic
commentary bear out this reading of the statute."); In re Letters Rogatory from the
Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976) (Section 1782 gives
courts broad discretion in deciding whether or not to honor letters rogatory); Brian E.
Bomstein &Julie M. Levitt, Much Ado About 1782: A Look at Recent Problems With Discovery
in the United Statesfor Use in ForeignLitigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U. Mmlsi INTERAm. L. REv. 429, 435 (1989) (stating that federal courts appear to doubt that Congress
intended to give courts unbridled discretion suggested by Section 1782).
13. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, (stating that statute's broad grant of discretion has led to courts struggling to construe statute consistently). SeegeneraUy Eileen
P. McCarthy, Note, A Proposed Uniform Standardfor U.S. Courts in Granting Requests For
InternationalJudicialAssistance, 15 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 772 (describing circuit courts'
varying interpretations of terms in statute); AmyJ. Conway, Note, In Re Request ForJudicial Assistance From the FederativeRepublic of Brazi" A Blow to InternationalJudicialAssistance, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 545 (1992) (noting inconsistent standards imposed by district
courts in Section 1782 cases).
14. Throughout this Note the terms "non-U.S. parties" and "non-U.S. litigants" refer to both non-U.S. and U.S. citizens who are involved in litigation abroad. See 28
U.S.C. § 1782, supra note 9 ("The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory

336

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 18:332

seeking judicial assistance from U.S. courts to receive different
treatment based on the geographic location of the evidence in
Specifically, the U.S. circuit courts disagree on
question. 15
whether Section 1782 contains a threshold requirement that evidence sought to be discovered under Section 1782 must also be
discoverable under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the liti18
gation will take place.' 6 The First' 7 and Eleventh Circuits have
held that Section 1782 contains a discoverability requirement,
which necessitates that any evidence sought to be discovered in
the U.S. district courts must also be discoverable under the laws
9
of the jurisdiction where the litigation is to take place.' In addition, two other circuit courts, although not expressly mandating
a discoverability requirement, have implied that such a requirement exists in the statute.20 The Second Circuit, however, in adissued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application
of any interested person ....- ).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782. According to Section 1782, the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the district of the district court to which the
application is made. Id. Therefore, a non-U.S. litigant seekingjudicial assistance within
the United States will receive disparate results depending upon the geographic location
of the evidence.
16. See Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) cert. denied, - U.S. -,
114 S. Ct. 443 (1994) (describing split between circuit courts in interpretation of discoverability requirement).
17. In re Application Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1992) ("We hold that a
litigant requesting assistance under Section 1782 has to show that the information
sought in the United States would be discoverable under foreign law.").
18. In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989) (stating that
district court "must decide whether the evidence would be discoverable in the foreign
country before granting assistance"); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir.
1988) (remanding case for determination on discoverability of evidence sought).
There also have been some lower court decisions which have reached the same conclusion. In re Application for an Order forJudicial Assistance in a Foreign Proceeding in
the High Court ofJustice, Chancery Diiision, England, 147 F.R.D. 233 (C.D. Cal. 1993)
(under Section 1782 parties "are not entitled to discovery beyond what is available to
them in the foreign court where the action is proceeding"); In re The Court of the
Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(asserting that courts should not allow litigants to circumvent restrictions imposed on
discovery by non-U.S. tribunals.).
19. See Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 58-60 (describing federal court decisions
that have recognized discoverability requirement).
20. See In re Request from Crown Prosecution Service of United Kingdom, 870
F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that procedures used under Section 1782 cannot be
inconsistent with intent to use evidence in non-U.S. judicial proceeding); John Deere
Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1985) (stating that "[a] grant of discovery
that trenched upon clearly established procedures of a foreign tribunal would not be
within section 1782").
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dressing the same question, concluded
that Section 1782 con2
tains no such implicit requirement. '
This Note argues that the Second Circuit's interpretation of
Section 1782 should become the standard throughout the federal courts because it applies proper canons of statutory interpretation, adheres to the U.S. Congress' intent to provide an efficient means of assistance to participants in non-U.S. tribunals,
and encourages other nations to provide similarly broad discovery requests when U.S. litigants seek evidence located abroad.
Part I discusses the development ofjudicial assistance statutes in
the United States and sets forth the U.S. congressional intent
behind the enactment of Section 1782. Part I also examines the
provisions of the current statute governing international judicial
assistance. Part II analyzes the split within the U.S. circuit courts
on whether Section 1782 contains an implied discoverability requirement. Part Ill argues that federal courts should adopt the
Second Circuit's reasoning and not read ajudicially-created barrier to discoverability into 28 U.S.C. § 1782. This Note concludes that the split in the circuit courts should be resolved in
favor of the Second Circuit's approach, thereby providing nonU.S. parties a uniform rule for conducting discovery within the
United States.
I. AN OVERVIEW OFINTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
International judicial assistance 22 is the process whereby
courts in one jurisdiction assist courts located in another jurisdiction in obtaining evidence. 3 The concept of international
21. See Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2nd Cir. 1993) ("We hold that section
1782 does not contain a requirement that the material requested in the district court be
discoverable under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction.").
22. See Weiner, supra note 5, at 60 n.1 ("The term 'internationaljudicial assistance'
is defined as servicing documents in foreign states and obtaining evidence in foreign
states."); see also Jones, supra note 7, at 515 n.1 (describing different terms used for
international judicial assistance in other countries).
23. See BRUNO A. RISTAU, 1 INTERNATIONALJUDICIAL ASSISTANCE CML AND COMMER-

§ (1990) ("[i]nternational judicial assistance [is the] assistance which domestic
courts render to courts and litigants in other countries"); Paul D. McCusker, Some
United States Practices in InternationalJudicial Assistance, 37 DEP'T STATE BuL. 808, 808
(1957) ("Judicial assistance is the aid rendered by the courts of one country to the
courts of another country in support ofjudicial proceedings taking place in the country
that requests the foreign court's cooperation."); Karl Schwappach, The Inter-American
Convention on TakingEvidence Abroad: A FunctionalComparisonwith the Hague Convention,
4 N.Y. INr'L L. REv. 69 (1991) ("The field of international judicial assistance represents
CIAL
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judicial assistance rests on the principle that jurisdictional
boundaries, which limit the ability of national courts to collect
evidence, 2 4 should not prevent such courts from obtaining all
5
the information needed to adjudicate disputes before them.
Judicial bodies originally did not render international judicial
assistance based on any positive law or duty.26 Instead, well-recognized principles of comity27 and reciprocity28 encouraged
courts in the United States to assist courts in other nations when
gathering evidence.2 9 Today, non-U.S. litigants and tribunals
seeking judicial assistance in the United States may utilize fedthe multinational goal of having nations render aid to one another in support of their
respective judicial or quasijudicial tribunals."). See generally Jones, supra note 7
(describing history, procedures, and issues in international judicial assistance).
24. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). The D.C. Circuit Court noted that
[t]he prerogative of a nation to control and regulate activities within its boundaries is an essential, definitional element of sovereignty.... Consequently, the
territoriality base ofjurisdiction is universally recognized. It is the most persuasive and basic principle underlying the exercise by nations of prescriptive
regulatory power. It is the customary basis of the application of law in virtually
every country.
Id. at 921.
25. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 430; see also McCusker, supra note 23, at
808 ("Even countries which are unfriendly with each other for political reasons do not
hesitate, except in case of actual war, to request each other's courts to further the cause
ofjustice.").
26. See RIsTAu, supra note 23, at 3 ("It is true that the duty [to render judicial
assistance] may not be imposed by positive local law, but it rests on national comity,
creating a duty that no state could refuse to fulfill without forfeiting its standing among
the civilized states of the world.") (quoting Oregon v. Bourne, 21 Or. 218, 228, 27 Pac.
1048 (1891)).
27. See P.F. Sutherland, The Use of the Letter of Request (or Letters Rogatory) For the
Purpose of ObtainingEvidence ForProceedings in England and Abroad, 31 INT'L CoMp. L.Q.
784, 785 (1982) (stating that "[c]ompliance with a letter of request received from a
foreign requesting court has generally been considered a matter of courtesy"); see also
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
'Comity,' refers to the recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64.
28. BLACK'S LAw DICaIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990). Reciprocity is defined as the
"relation existing between two states when each of them gives the subjects of the other
certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall enjoy similar privileges at the
hands of the latter state." Id.
29. See Devine & Olsen, supra note 1, at 372 n.26 ("The willingness of courts to
execute such requests, in the absence of a statute or treaty, is grounded in international
good will and comity."); Born & Hoing, supra note 6, at 393 (stating that "U.S. courts
have invoked the doctrine of international comity to moderate the conflicts that have
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eral and state statutes, 30 international accords, 31 and mutual
arisen between extraterritorial U.S. discovery orders and foreign laws and sovereign
interests"). But see Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937. The D.C. Circuit Court stated:
However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign
act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic
recognition could tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage
retaliation, undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are
fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the
earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign
act.
Id.

30. See supra note 9 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1782). Most individual states also have
their own statutes governing international judicial assistance. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L.
& R- 328 (McKinney 1988) Rule 328, entitled assistance to tribunals and litigants
outside the state, reads in pertinent part:
(a) Pursuant to court order. Upon application by any interested person or in
response to letters rogatory issued by a tribunal outside the state, the supreme
court or a county court of the state may order service upon any person who is
domiciled or can be found within the state of any document issued in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside the state. The order shall direct
the manner of service.
(b) Without court order. Service in connection with a proceeding in a tribunal outside the state may be made within the state without an order of the
court.
Id.; CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 2029 (West 1994). The California statute, states in pertinent part:
[cIompelling deponent to appear and testify, and to produce documents and
things upon issuance of commission out of foreign court of record.
Whenever any mandate, writ, letters rogatory, letter of request, or commission is issued out of any court of record in any other state, territory, or
district of the United States, or in a foreign nation ... the deponent may be
compelled to appear and testify, and to produce documents and things, in the
same manner, and by the same process as may be employed for the purpose of
taking testimony in actions pending in California.
Id.

31. See The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. For a discussion on the Hague Evidence

Convention, see Schwappach, supranote 23, at 69; Born &Hoing, supra note 6, at 396
("The [Evidence] Convention is a multilateral agreement that prescribes procedures by
which litigants involved in civil and commercial disputes may obtain evidence from
abroad."); see also Hague Convention of the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658
U.N.T.S. 163. For a discussion on the Hague Service Convention, see Hans Smit, Recent
Developments in InternationalLitigation, 35 S. TEx. L. Ray. 215, (1994) (concluding that
flexible domestic rules are preferable to international agreements when regulating international litigation); United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, December 20, 1988 U.N. Doc. E/Conf./82/15, re-
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legal assistance treaties.3 2
Although other methods for obtaining judicial assistance in
States exist, Section 1782 is a principal choice for
United
the
parties abroad. 33 Section 1782 authorizes U.S. district courts to
grant judicial assistance to non-U.S. parties requesting information in the form of letters rogatory 3 4 A letter rogatory is a formal request by the court of one nation to the appropriate court
of another nation for assistance in procuring desired evidence. 5
printed in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Zagaris, supra note 4, at 345-48 (describing international judicial assistance requirements in U.N. Drug Convention).
32. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, U.S.-Belg., S. TR.A7Y Doc.
No. 16, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Treaty Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9,
1987, U.S.-Can., S. Tp.Arv Doc. No. 13, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988); Treaty Between
the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Concerning the Caynan Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, July 3, 1986, U.S.-U.K-N. Ir., S. TRAw Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 537-52; Treaty with the Italian Republic on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, U.SAtaly, S. TRaErv Doc. No. 25, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984). For a discussion of mutual legal assistance treaties, see Marian Nash,
JudicialAssistance, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 548 (1992). "Mutual legal assistance treaties are
generally intended to enable law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence abroad."
Id. at 550; see also Zagaris, supra note 4, at 351-357 (discussing procedures and status of
mutual legal assistance treaties in United States).
33. See Walter B. Stahr, Discovey Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreignand International
Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INr'L L, 597, 599 (1990) ("[T]he litigation regarding discovery in
the United States for use abroad has turned on the proper interpretation and application of section 1782, not on the interpretation of the Hague [Evidence] Convention.").
Litigation involving the Hague Evidence Convention has focused on parties using the
treaty to obtain evidence outside the United States for use in U.S. tribunals. See, e.g.,
Societe National Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522,
539-40 (1987) (determining when U.S. parties seeking extraterritorial discovery must
do so under Hague Evidence Convention rather than U.S. discovery rules).
34. See McCusker, supra note 23, at 808. Courts traditionally requestjudicial assistance from their foreign counterparts by issuing a letter rogatory. Id. For a discussion
on the procedures and mechanics of a letter rogatory, see Deutsch, supra note 5, at 17981; Gary B. Born & David Westin, InternationalCivil Litigation in United States Courts,
(1992) 40-41 (providing model letter rogatory); RIsrAu, supra note 23, at 31-50
(describing procedures and documents for obtaining international judicial assistance in
United States).
35. De Villeneuve v. MorningJournal Ass'n, 206 F. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); see Stahr
supra note 33, at 600 n.12; see also The Sigue, 37 F.Supp. 819 (D.La. 1941).
Letters rogatory are the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking
through one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own
courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within
the latter's control, to assist the administration ofjustice in the former country; such request being made, and being usually granted, by reason of comity,
existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times.
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The letter rogatory may be transmitted through the U.S. Justice
Department,"6 the U.S. State Department, or sent directly from
the non-U.S. tribunal to the U.S. district court.3 7 Furthermore,
make a Section 1782 request directly
any interested person may
8
to a U.S. district court.
A. The Development of InternationalJudicialAssistance in the
United States
Until 1855, U.S. federal district courts had no explicit authorization to compel an unwilling witness to give testimony or
produce documents in response to a letter rogatory.3 9 The imI&. at 820; see Born & Hoing, supra note 6 at 395 ("The customary method of obtaining
foreign judicial assistance in taking evidence abroad, in absence of a specific treaty
obligation, has been by letter rogatory."). For a discussion on the disadvantages of letters rogatory, see generally Jones, supra note 7 (discussing problems with using letters
rogatory); Deutsch, supra note 5, at 178-81 (discussing problems with letters rogatory).
For a comparison of letters rogatory with commissions, see Stahr, supra note 33, at 600
n.13 ("The basic alternative to a letter rogatory is a commission, which appoints a particular person to obtain evidence."); Field, supra note 4, at 702 ("The effectiveness of
letters rogatory depends on comity between nations.").
36. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Civil Division Practice Manual § 4-1.325 (stating procedures for judicial assistance to foreign tribunals). Requests by governments for discovery in the United States in criminal cases are frequently made to the Justice Department, which may represent the government in the district court Section 1782 proceeding. See, e.g., In re Letters of Request from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad &
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1152 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989) (U.S.
Department ofJustice representing Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago in
Section 1782 request).
37. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspection of the
Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
38. Stahr, supra note 33, at 627.
Although federal law is liberal regarding the form of a request for discovery
under Section 1782, some types of requests are more likely to receive a
favorable reception than others. Requests from courts are more likely to be
granted than requests from governments; requests from governments are
more likely to be granted than requests from litigants. Although it is not unreasonable for courts to consider somewhat more carefully requests from foreign litigants, they should not create artificial barriers to direct discovery by
litigants. Such barriers would be inconsistent both with section 1782, which
allows direct requests by foreign litigants, and with our customary reliance
upon litigants, not courts, to conduct discovery.
Id.
39. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855). Some judges and
commentators, however, believed that there was no need for explicit statutory authorization permitting courts to respond to letters rogatory. See In re Letter Rogatory from
the Justice Ct., Dist. of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562, 564 (6th Cir. 1975) ("it has
been held that federal courts have inherit power to issue and respond to letters rogatory") (citing United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 (6th Cir. 1971)); United States
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petus for enacting legislation to empower the federal courts with
such authority came in 1854 when the French government sent
the U.S. Department of State a letter rogatory requesting the
deposition of a witness located in New York State.4 0 The U.S.
Attorney General concluded that no statute authorized a federal
court to compel a witness to testify in reply to the French letter
rogatory.41 In response to this deficiency in the law, the U.S.
Congress passed the first statute enabling U.S. federal courts to
assist non-U.S. courts in procuring. evidence located within the
42
United States.
Pursuant to the Act of March 2, 1855 ("1855 Act") U.S. federal courts were accorded broad authority to compel the testimony of witnesses to assist non-U.S. courts.43 Specifically, the
1855 Act authorized U.S. circuit courts to appoint a commissioner to compel testimony from witnesses identified in a letter
rogatory.44 The 1855 Act, however, failed to achieve its intended
result of providing non-U.S. courts with judicial assistance due to

v. Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1958); Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 256-57
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887); see also 8 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2195a n.2 (3d ed. 1940) ("That
any domestic court has inherit power at common law to honor a letter rogatory should
not be doubted."); Devine & Olsen, supra note 1, at 372 n.26 (stating that federal courts
have held the issuance of letters rogatory to be within their inherent powers). But see
Janssen v. Belding-Corticelli, 84 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1936) (arguing that only power that
court has to respond to letters rogatory is granted to it by U.S. Constitution or by statute).
40. SeeJones, supra note 7, at 540-42 (chronicling history ofjudicial assistance in
United States). The French government at that time was acting on behalf of a French
juge d'instruction,a magistrate sitting in a preliminary criminal proceeding. Id. at 541.
41. See generally 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 56 (1855) (reviewing letter written by Attorney
General Cushing to Secretary of State Marcy, which discussed defect in American law
and probable solution).
42. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855); seeJones, supra note 7,
at 540-41 (describing history of 1855 Act); see also Stahr, supra note 33, at 600-05 (documenting stages of international judicial assistance in United States).
43. In re Montrea Canada,523 F.2d at 564 ("This statute granted broad powers to
the United States courts to compel the testimony of witnesses to assist foreign courts.").
44. Act of March 2, 1855. Section 2 of the 1855 Act states:
addressed from any court of a for[W]here letters rogatory shall have be [sic]
eign country to any circuit court of the United States, and a United States
commissioner designated by said circuit court to make the examination of witnesses in said letters mentioned, said commissioner shall be empowered to
compel the witnesses to appear and depose in the same manner as to appear
and testify in court.
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an error in indexing.4 5 This error resulted in the disuse of the
1855 Act by the U.S. federal courts.4 6
In 1863, another more restrictive statute was passed by the
U.S. Congress governing discovery requests from other nations." The 1863 Act permitted a federal court, in response to a
letter rogatory, to compel a witness located in the United States
to provide testimony for use in anotherjurisdiction.4 8 The 1863
Act, however, placed various conditions on when federal courts
could provide such judicial assistance.4 9 The 1863 statute stipulated that federal courts could respond to letters rogatory only in
cases where: (1) the non-U.S. litigation was for the recovery of
money or property; (2) the requesting country was not at war
with the United States; and (3) the requesting government was a
party to or had an interest in the litigation. 50 These statutorily
imposed requirements inhibited the ability of U.S. courts to offer litigants from other countries the same judicial assistance
that American parties received abroad.5 Thus, for almost a cen45. Jones, supra note 7, at 540. The 1855 Act was indexed in the Statutes at Large
under the heading "Mistrials." Id. at 540 n.77.
46. Id. at 540; see also Stahr, supra note 33, at 60 n.18 (stating that 1855 Act was
omitted from federal code index).
47. Compare Act of March 2, 1855 with Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, §§ 1-4, 12 Stat.
769-70 (1863). The 1863 Act was proposed by the Treasury Department, apparently
unaware of the existence of the 1855 Act. Jones, supra note 7, at 540 n.77.
48. See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769.
49. Id. The 1863 Act stated in pertinent part:
An Act to facilitate the taking of depositions within the United States, to
be used in the Courts of other Countries, and for other Purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that the testimony of any witness
residing within the United States, to be used in any suit for the recovery of
money or property depending in any court in any foreign country with which
the United States are at peace, and in which the government of such foreign
country shall be a party or shall have an interest, may be obtained, to be used
in such suit.
Id.
50. Id. Following the passage of the 1863 Act Congress attempted, but failed, to
successfully amend the 1863 Act in order to provide broader assistance. See In re Montreaf4 Canada523 F.2d at 564 n.5 (describing congressional attempts to liberalize 1863
Act).
51. See Note, ReciprocityforLetters Rogatory Under theJudicidalCode, 58 YALE LJ. 1193,
1195 ("the federal courts and Congress have ungenerously refused to accord foreign
letters [rogatory] the same treatment which foreign courts have been requested to extend to American letters"); Jones, supra note 7, at 540-41 ("For almost a century, requests for assistance in foreign private litigation were denied hospitality in our federal
courts. And for almost a century, our national government remained unperturbed by
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tury, the 1863 Act prohibited non-U.S. parties from conducting
necessary discovery in the United States.52
After World War II, the U.S. position as an economic superpower considerably increased U.S. involvement in international
trade and global investment.53 The international disputes which
resulted due to the prominent status of the United States required that evidence located within the United States be used in
litigation throughout the world.54 In an attempt to enable federal courts to meet the increasing demand for discovery requests
from abroad, the U.S. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in
1948. 55 The 1948 statute broadened the authority of district
courts by allowing the courts to designate a person who could
depose any witness residing in the United States for use in a civil
this judicial apathy."); HenryJones also commented on the condition of U.S. federal
law in this manner: "[I ] t is probable that no other government permits such widespread
confusion and such profound disregard for the concept of comity or international obligation in connection with judicial assistance between nations." Id. at 538.
52. Jones, supra note 7, at 540. In 1939, an international practitioner wrote that
[t]he difficulties surrounding the securing of evidence abroad are such as to
confound any general practitioner not experienced in such matters. Even to
one who has the necessary experience, the delays and red tape involved in an
effort to secure such evidence create a formidable psychological barrier in the
prosecution of a litigation.
Raymond T. Heilpern, ProcuringEvidence Abroad, 14 TuL L. REv. 29 (1939).
53. See S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprintedin 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N
5201. The Senate Report stated:
Overseas investment by United States citizens and business firms have
multiplied considerably since the conclusion of World War II. In addition, the
United States Government has instituted trade and aid programs of considerable magnitude. These developments have occasioned an interrelation of the
financial and commercial life in this country and abroad to a degree unparalleled in history. Yet, oddly enough, this expansion of international business
activities has not been accompanied by a modernization of international legal
procedures necessary to settle commercial disputes. This deficiency was evident to some in the legal profession before World War II, but it has become
increasingly apparent to the bar since the war.
Id. at 5201; see also Smit, supra note 3, at 1015 (attributing growth in international litigation to increase in international commerce); Deutsch, supra note 5, at 176 n.6 (attributing increased need for international litigation to significant increase in international
transactions during twentieth century).
54. SeeJones, supra note 7, at 558 (explaining how surge in international litigation
following World War II revealed inadequacy of federal judicial assistance statute); see
also S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 8 ("The steadily growing involvement of the United
States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other
devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation.").
55. Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 949 (1948).
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case in another country.56
By enacting the 1948 statute, the U.S. Congress took a significant step in accommodating external requests for judicial
assistance in U.S. federal courts.57 Following the 1948 statute,
the U.S. Congress continued to amend Section 1782, broadening its application to include criminal actions, while simplifying
the procedures used to obtain evidence.5" Critics of Section
1782, however, continued to consider this statute too narrow in
its scope, thereby restricting cooperation among national and international judicial systems.59
B. CongressionalRevision of 28 U.S.C. § 1782
In response to growing criticism and the increased demand
placed on U.S. courts to provide international judicial assistance,
the U.S. Congress, in 1958, created the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure (the "Commission").60 The
56. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (1948). The statute provided
in pertinent part that:
[t]he deposition of any witness within the United States to be used in any civil
action pending in any court in a foreign country with which the United States
is at peace may be taken before a person ...designated by the district court of
any district where the witness resides or may be found.
Id.

57. In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989)
("[b]eginning in 1948, Congress enacted several amendments that broadened the scope
of the statute.) The 1948 amendment expanded judicial authority by allowing district
courts to provide assistance in all civil actions pending in any court of another country.
Id. The amendment also deleted the requirement that the foreign government must be
a party to or have an interest in the litigation. Id.
58. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949). Congress modified the
limitation that the non-U.S. litigation must be for the recovery of money or property
and eventually only required that the action be a judicial proceeding.
Section 1782 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking out "residing", which appears as the sixth word in the first paragraph, and by striking
out from the same paragraph the words "civil action" and in lieu thereof inserting "judicial proceeding."
Id.
59. See Smit, supra note 3, at 1026 (stating that problems with previous statute
called for revisions).
60. Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958). Section 2
of the Act gave the Commission the following tasks:
The Commission shall investigate and study existing practices ofjudicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a
view to achieving improvements. To the end that procedures necessary or incidental to the conduct and settlement of litigation in State and Federal
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Commission's principal task was to study and recommend improvements to Section 1782.61 The Commission determined
that before it would consider any international agreements, it
would first concentrate on unilateral improvements to U.S
laws. 6 2 In 1964, the Commission's proposed amendments to Section 1782 were enacted into law by the 88th U.S. Congress withCourts and quasijudicial agencies which involve the performance of acts in
foreign territory, such as the service of judicial documents, the obtaining of
evidence, and the proof of foreign law, may be more readily ascertainable,
efficient, economical, and expeditious, and that the procedures of our State
and Federal tribunals for the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and
quasi-judicial agencies be similarly improved, the Commission shall(a) draft for the assistance of the Secretary of State international
agreements to be negotiated by him;
(b) draft and recommend to the President any necessary legislation;
(c) recommend to the President such other action as may appear
advisable to improve and codify international practice in civil, criminal,
and administrative proceedings; and
(d) perform such other related duties as the President may assign.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5201. The Senate Report stated:
[t]he extensive increase in international, commercial and financial transactions involving both individuals and governments and the resultant disputes,
leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demonstrated the need and
comprehensive study of the extent to which international judicial assistance
can be obtained. The study is of such magnitude that it cannot readily be
handled by some private body or law school institute, It should be an integrated study with participation by representatives of the bar and of the government.
Id. at 5202-03. For a discussion on the Commission, see Smit, supra note 31, at 217-19;
see also Conway, supra note 13, at 555-56 n.71 (listing some members who served on
Commission and its Advisory Board).
61. Conway, supra note 13, at 555-56 (describing goals of Commission). For a description on the tasks and accomplishments of the commission, see Philip W. Amram,
Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964-New Developments in InternationalJudicialAssistance in the United States of America, 32 D. C. B~ARJ. 24 (1965).
62. See Amram, supra note 61.

[T]he Commission] determined that its first task would be exclusively domestic. Before entering into any consideration of international agreements...
the Commission determined to recommend to the appropriate authorities
unilateral internal improvements and modernization of the United States
Code, the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the statutes of
the several states.
Id. at 25; see also COMM'N ON INT'L RuLs OFJUDICIAL PROCEDURE, FouRTH ANNuAL RE.
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS,

H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong.,

1st Sess. viii (1963) ("The Commission determined at the outset that it should begin its

work with the reform and improvements of domestic practices."); Smit, supra note 3, at
1016 ("It was decided that domestic reform should be the object of initial attention
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out any revision.63
The 1964 amendments had two major objectives.' First,
the revisions were meant to provide a liberal and efficient means
of assistance to international litigation in U.S. federal courts. 5
Second, the revisions were designed to encourage, by example,
other nations to provide similar means of assistance to U.S.
courts.6 6 The authors of the 1964 amendments believed that the
revisions would facilitate international litigation and encourage
other countries to make similar improvements to their judicial
systems. The first amendment made to Section 1782 expanded
the type of evidence that federal courts could obtain for use in
63. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9, 78 Stat. 995 (1964) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1782). For a discussion on the philosophy behind the amendments, see generally Amram, supra note 61.
64. Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United Technologies, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied sub nom. United Technologies Int'l v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 179 (1992). The Court stated that the amendments had the "twin
aims of providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation
in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar
means of assistance to our courts." United Technologies, 964 F.2d at 100. The primary
intent of the amendments was to "clarif[y] and liberalize[ ] existing U.S. procedures for
assisting foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral and documentary evidence in the United States." S. RP. No. 1580 supra note 8, at 3784.
65. United Technologies, 964 F.2d at 100.
66. See Letter from Rep. Oscar Cox, Chairman of Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure, to John McCormack, Speaker of the House, (May 28,
1963), reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792-94. "The Commission hopes that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries
similarly to adjust their procedures ....
Enactment of the proposed bill should encourage foreign nations to follow the example of the United States." Id. at 3794.
67. See John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 ("Congress did not
intend Section 1782 orders to depend upon reciprocal agreements."); Amram, supra
note 61, at 28 ("Wide judicial assistance is granted on a wholly unilateral basis. No
reciprocity is required.") (emphasis added); Philip W. Amram, The Proposed International
Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A. J. 650, 651 (1965) ("It is not
unfair to say that Public Law 88-619 [Section 1782] is a one way street. It grants wide
assistance to others, but demands nothing in return. It was deliberately drawn this
way.").
Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the
United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of
sister nations and thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for
the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international
aspects.
It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its
procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures.
S. REP No. 1580, supra note 8, at 3783. For a discussion on the failure of other governments to provide reciprocal treatment to U.S. litigants, see Schwappach, supra note 23,
at 69.
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non-U.S. proceedings.6 8 Originally, Section 1782 only allowed a"
district court to assist in the taking of depositions and testimony.6 9 After 1964, however, federal courts could also assist in
obtaining documents and other tangible evidence for trials
abroad.70
In addition, the U.S. Congress modified the requirement
that the evidence sought had to be used in another nation's
"court " by substituting the term "tribunal"7 ' and adding "international tribunals."7 2 This revision permitted district courts to
assist in proceedings before other countries' investigating magistrates, international administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, and international judicial actions. 73 Furthermore, the
amended statute added that any interested person could request
judicial assistance.7 4 This allowed not only foreign tribunals and
officials, but also private litigants, to initiate discovery proceedings. 75 The 1964 amendments represent the latest progression
68. See In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1005 (1989) (outlining changes produced by 1964 amendments).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see Smit, supra note 3, at 1026 (1965) ("[N]ew Section 1782] ...properly
recognizes thatjudicial co-operation should be available on the same terms irrespective
of the nature of the evidence sought.").
71. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988). For a discussion on the legislative history of the switch from the word "court" to the word "tribunal," see S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 8, at 3788.
72. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The amendments...
expanded the class of litigation in which section 1782 could be used by substituting the
word 'tribunal' for the word 'court.' "); see Smit, supra note 3, at 1027 n.73 (stating
increasing number an importance of international tribunals). Commentators of that
time period noted that the statute's expansion to include international tribunals was of
great significance. Id., For a history of assistance to international tribunals, see Hans
Smit, AssistanceRenderedBy the United States in ProceedingsBefore InternationalTribunals,62
COLuM. L. Rv.1264 (1962).
73. In re Montreal,523 F.2d at 565 ("Also noteworthy is the use of the word 'tribunal' in place of 'court.' ").

74. See Deutsch, supra note 5, at 178 ("The phrase 'interested person,' refers both
to persons designated under foreign law to seek the evidence and to parties to foreign
or international litigation.").
75. Compare Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988)) with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988). The 1964
amendments also abolished the limitation that evidence could only be discovered for
use in a country with which the United States was at peace because the framers of the
amendments realized that such problems were already regulated by the Trading With
the Enemy Act. Smit, supra note 3, at 1028.
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of judicial assistance statutes in the United States. 76 Section
1782 represents the modem view of providing a liberal approach
to international judicial assistance."
C. The Present State of 28 U.S.C. § 1782
By amending Section 1782 in 1964, the U.S. Congress gave
federal courts complete discretion in deciding the appropriate
procedures to be followed by the party requesting discovery. 78
The pertinent Senate Report stated that the purpose of revising
Section 1782 was to clarify and liberalize U.S. procedures for assisting non-U.S. and international tribunals in obtaining evidence in the United States. 79 Section 1782 now gives U.S. district courts complete discretion to decide whether they will grant
judicial assistance under the statute. 80 Moreover, a U.S. district
court, in response to a Section 1782 request, has the discretion
to observe the discovery rules of the relevant foreign jurisdiction
or to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 ' However,
76. In re Montreal, 523 F.2d at 565 (chronicling evolutionary process of international judicial assistance under U.S. law).
77. See Smit, supra note 31, at 229 (describing liberal grant of judicial assistance
under U.S. Code).
78. SeeJohn Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 100 F.R.D. 712,714 (E.D.Pa. 1983) ("[T]he
use of permissive, as opposed to mandatory language in the provision makes it clear
that there is no automatic right to a section 1782 order. Instead, Section 1782 grants
the district courts broad discretion to issue or to decline to issue, a discovery order.").
For an example of the procedures courts employ under Section 1782, see Application of
Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 54-56.
79. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 8, at 3788-90.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). The statute states that the district court "may" grant a
request, but it does not give the court much guidance as to "when" it may do so. See
supranote 9 for entire text of section 1782;John Deere Ltd., 100 F.R.D. at 714 (stating
that Section 1782 grants district courts broad discretion to issue or decline to issue
discovery order); Amram, supra note 61, at 31 (describing unrestricted grant of power
to courts); Smit, supra note 3, at 1029 (explaining district court's discretion under Section 1782); Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 446 ("The effect of the statute's broadly
drafted language has been the granting of complete discretion to the district court in
evaluating section 1782 requests. Noticeably absentare properguidelinesfor the exercise of this
discretion.") (emphasis added).
81. See S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 8. The report states that Section 1782
permits, but does not command, following the foreign or international practice. If the court fails to prescribe the procedure, the appropriate provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be followed, irrespective of
whether the foreign or international proceeding ... is of a criminal, civil,
administrative, or other nature.
Id. Since Congress passed the 1964 amendments without debating the recommendations of the Committee there is not a lot of evidence of the Congressional viewpoint in
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because the Commission's proposal was passed through the U.S.
Congress without debate and Congress did not clearly define key
words in the statute, there has been a great deal of conflict
among the U.S. federal circuit courts over the proper interpretation of Section 1782.82 As a result, the statute's guidelines, crite83
ria, and terminology have not been construed consistently.
II. SPLIT AMONG THE FEDERAL, CIRCUITS OVER THE
INTERPRETATION OF 28 U.S. C. § 1782: DOES THE STATUTE
IMPLICITLY REQUIRE THAT EVIDENCE SOUGHT MUST BE
DISCOVERABLE UNDER THE LAWS OF THE
FOREIGNJURISDICTION?
Although the U.S. Congress did not give the federal courts
strict guidelines for interpreting Section 1782, the legislative history did state that a district court, in exercising its discretionary
powers, may take into account the nature and attitudes of the
government making the request and the character of the prothis area. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 439 ("Congress played no role in
redrafting the statute. Rather, the new draft was written entirely by an advisory committee and adopted summarily."). However, the statements that do exist clearly establish
Congress' intent to liberalize the judicial assistance procedures by allowing the courts
wide discretion. Smit, supra note 31, at 219 n.18 ("since Congress adopted [the Commission's] proposals, including the legislative history, without change, the argument
that Congress had an intent other than that of the drafters would appear difficult to
maintain"); see also In re Court of Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of South Africa,
88 F.R.D. 75 (E.D.Pa. 1980). The In re South Africa court reasoned:
In contrast to the usual circumstances concerning letters rogatory, the requesting party in this case is a litigant in a foreign action. While this in no way
derogates from his right to petition this Court for such a request, it does complicate analysis of this Court's appropriate exercise of discretion. If the purpose of the act enabling this Court to grant such a request is, as stated, for the
improvement of international cooperation, and if, as it appears, Congressexpects
the district court to grant requests that will spur a reciprocity of cooperation, then this
Court must act with special regard for the South African Commissioner of
Patents, who is not represented here.
1d. at 77 (emphasis added). In In re South Africa, the court found it useful to use discoverability as a guide in its exercise of discretion because the Commissioner of Patents was
not represented in the action and the courts had grounds to believe that the applicant
was attempting to circumvent South African discovery restrictions. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.$d at 61 n.3 (citing In re South Africa, 88 F.R.D. at 77).
82. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 446-47. "[S]ome courts, interpreting
the same statutory words, have drawn opposite conclusions; still other courts have applied the statute in a fashion which seems at odds with the policy behind it." Id.
83. Id. at 446 ("judicial interpretation of the statute has not been uniform"); see
Smit, supra note 3, at 1029 (describing Congress' lack of precision in granting district
courts broad discretion in granting judicial assistance).
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ceedings in which the discovered evidence will be used. 4 The
U.S. district courts, however, have been reluctant to use those
guidelines when making discretionary decisions under Section
1782.85 One reason for this may be that the U.S. Congress
neither explained nor demonstrated how the courts should interpret and then apply these terms.8 6 The discretion issue,
therefore, continues to be troublesome for the courts.
One area where the issue of proper discretion plays a controversial role is in the district court's analysis of the other nation's laws and procedures.8 7 According to Section 1782, the district court, in its discretion, may order that the discovery be conducted according to the procedural rules of the non-U.S. or
international tribunal.88 If the court does not make such a determination, the parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when conducting discovery within the United
States.

9

Some U.S. circuit courts have held that Section 1782 contains an implicit requirement that controls any exercise of discretion as to the discovery procedures to be followed.90 This im84. S. REP. No. 1580, supra note 8, at 3788. The report stated that:
In exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into account the nature and attitudes of the government of the countyfrom which the request emanatesand
the characterof the proceedings in that counry, or in the case ofproceedings before an
internationaltribunal, the nature of the tribunal and the character of the proceedings before it.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 450. "[N]early all of the courts interpreting Section 1782 have declined to base their decisions upon Congress' standards,
yet Congress has taken no action to let the courts know that the legislature is displeased
with the alternative tests used by the courts." Id at 450 n.91; Smit, supra note 31, at 229
(describing federal courts reluctance to follow clearly expressed provisions of Section
1782).
86. Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 448. One discretionary factor that arises
from the legislative history is that the lack of reciprocity given to U.S. citizens in the
foreign jurisdiction is not a valid reason for a district-court to deny a discovery request.
Id.
87. See John Deere Ltd., 754 F.2d at 132 (reversing district court's refusal to grant
discovery under Section 1782, which was based, in part, on district court's erroneous
view that material sought must itself be admissible).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
89. Id.; see Deutsch, supra note 5, at 189 (describing procedural options under
Section 1782).
90. In re Application of Asta Medica, SA., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Letter
of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686
(D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir 1988); In re
Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d
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plicit requirement provides that material sought to be discovered in the United States must also be discoverable under the
laws of the extraterritorial jurisdiction where the litigation is taking place. 9 In effect, this implicit discovery requirement mandated by some circuit courts places an extra burden upon parties
requesting discovery under Section 1782. The issue of whether
or not Section 1782 contains an implicit discoverability require92
ment has caused a split in the U.S. federal circuit courts.
A. The Majority View. Section 1782 Contains an Implicit
Requirement That the MaterialRequested in the District
Court Be Discoverable Under the Laws of the
ExternalJurisdiction
Cases representing the majority reasoning" require a nonU.S. litigant to make a preliminary threshold showing that the
material sought would be discoverable in the non-U.S jurisdic94
tion before obtaining discovery in the United States. Since this
is a threshold requirement, the discretion of the district court is
eliminated.
1. The Origins of the Discoverability Requirement
The first court to examine the discoverability requirement
did so in 1980. 95 In In re the Court of the Comm'r of Patentsfor the
Republic of South Africa,96 the Pennsylvania district court held that
it would not direct a person under its jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents absent a showing by the requesting
party that the materials requested were discoverable under laws
1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989);John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Co.,
754 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1985).
91. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (describing split in circuit courts
on discoverability issue).
92. Compare Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993) with In re Asta Medica
S.A., 981 F.2d at 1, and In re Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988).
93. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (describing discoverability requirement).
94. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
95. In re the Court of the Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, 88
F.R.D. 75 (E.D.Pa. 1980).
96. In re Court of Comm'r of Patents for the Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D.
75 (E.D.Pa. 1980). In this case, a party to a South African patent litigation requested
discovery of documents from an American corporation located in Pennsylvania. Id. at
76.
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of the country where the litigation was taking place. 7 The district court concluded that it should not, by exercise of its discretion under Section 1782, permit litigants to circumvent the discovery restrictions imposed by another nation's judicial system.98
The court reasoned that since the congressional purpose behind
the 1964 amendments to Section 1782 was to encourage reciprocity and judicial cooperation, this goal would be impeded if
discovery offending the non-U.S. jurisdiction took place in the
United States.9 9 Although the district court did not expressly
97. Id. at 77. The district court differentiated this case from the more traditional
judicial assistance cases because the requesting party was not a tribunal or an official
governmental entity but was a litigant in the non-U.S. action. I& The In re South Africa
court held that under such circumstances, it must act with special regard, to the South
African Commissioner of Patents because the Commissioner was not represented in the
proceedings. Id. The court stated that
[i]n contrast to the usual circumstances concerning letters rogatory, the requesting party in this case is a litigant in a foreign action. While this in no way
derogates from his right to petition this Court for such a request, it does complicate analysis of this Court's appropriate exercise of discretion. If the purpose of the act enabling this court to grant such a request is, as stated, for the
improvement of international cooperation, and if, as it appears, Congress expects the district courts to grant requests that will spur a reciprocity of cooperation, then this Court must act with special regard for the South African Commissioner of Patents, who is not represented here.
I. Furthermore,
if, as in the usual case of letters rogatory, the foreign tribunal were represented here, the task of this Court would be very much simpler. Were that the
situation, and the foreign tribunal could instruct this Court as to its law, this
Court would not hesitate to order discovery consistent with South African law.
Id. at 77 n.1 (citation omitted). Most cases concerning Section 1782's discoverability
requirement distinguish cases that involve a direct request for assistance from a nonU.S. tribunal from cases where the request is made from an individual party from the
non-U.S. proceeding. See In re Application for an order for Judicial Assistance in a
Foreign Proceeding in the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147
F.R.D. 223 (D.C.Ca. 1993).
Where the request emanates from the tribunal itself, it is clear that the discovery sought is permitted and authorized by that body. Where the request is
made by an adverse party in a foreign proceeding.., the federal courts must
exercise caution to prevent the circumvention of foreign discovery provisions
and procedures. While individual litigants are entitled to make requests for
assistance under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, such requests do not establish the foreign
court's position as to the discovery sought.
Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
98. In re Republic of South Africa, 88 F.RD. at 77.
99. Id. "Few actions could more significantly impede the development of international cooperation among courts than if the courts of the United States operated to give
litigants in foreign cases processes of law to which they were not entitled in the appropriate foreign tribunal." Id.

354

FORDHAMNTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 18:332

state that Section 1782 contained a discoverability requirement,
the district court's holding implied that Section 1782 contained
a discoverability requirement. 0 0
The next case to examine the discoverability requirement
Deere Ltd. v. Speny Corp.."' In that case the Third CirJohn
was
cuit held that Section 1782 does not require a district court to
consider the ultimate admissibility of evidence in the external
jurisdiction prior to granting a discovery order requested by a
non-U.S. litigant. 0 2 In reaching this conclusion, the John Deere
court seemed to acknowledge that in cases where an individual
litigant requests judicial assistance, as opposed to another court
through a letter rogatory, the district court should make a determination on whether the evidence requested is discoverable
under the laws of the jurisdiction where the litigation will take
place.10 3 The John Deere court cited In re the Court of the Comm'r of
Patentsfor the Republic of South Africa case for the proposition that
other countries' discovery proceedings should not be circumvented.'0 4 The court, however, was willing to allow discovery to
proceed in this case because the evidence sought would also be
discoverable in Canada and the Canadian court would not be
offended.'0 5
100. Id.; see Stahr, supra note 33, at 609 (describing language of court in In Re
South Africa as "unfortunately broad").
101. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1985). This case
involved a patent infringement dispute in the Federal Court of Canada. Id. The defendant sought to depose and acquire documents from two American employees of the
Sperry Corporation. Id.
102. Id. at 135-36 (stating that it is not within province of district courts to decide
if evidence sought is admissible in external jurisdiction).
103. Id. at 136. The court stated that "[a]s a cooperative measure, section 1782
cannot be said to ignore those considerations of comity and sovereignty that pervade
international law. A grant of discovery that trenched upon the clearly established procedures of a foreign tribunal would not be within section 1782." Id. at 135. "Concern
that foreign discovery provisions not be circumvented by procedures authorized in
American courts is particularly pronounced where a request for assistance issues not
from letters rogatory but from an individual litigant." Id. at 135, 136 (citation omitted).
104. Id. at 136. The John Deere court cited In re the Court of the Comm'r of Patentsfor
the Republic of South Africa as an example of a district court denying a discovery request
because an individual litigant did not show that the documents sought would be discoverable in the externaljurisdiction. Moreover, the language used by the court seemed to
imply that it agreed with the district court's decision. The court stated that "[i]n In re
the Court of the Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South Africa... the court
denied a request for discovery where it was doubtful that the documents and testimony
sought would be discoverable under South African law." Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. "We are also satisfied that permitting discovery in this case would not
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2. The Discoverability Requirement Takes Hold Among the
Circuit Courts: The Eleventh Circuit Constrains the
District Court's Discretion by Mandating the
Discoverability Requirement
In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit, in two separate cases, expressly stated that Section 1782 contains an implicit discoverability requirement.1 0 6 In the first case, In re Request for Assistance
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago,1 7 the court
held that although a district court should refrain from deciding
whether the evidence requested will be admissible in the external jurisdiction, the district court is required to decide whether
the evidence would be discoverable in the external jurisdiction
before granting assistance.'
The Trinidad court did not give
any reason for mandating the discoverability requirement in Section 1782 cases. Instead, the court cited the Third Circuit's John
Deere decision and the Pennsylvania District Court's South Africa
decision as support for its conclusion. 10 9
The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its interpretation of Section 1782 four months later with its decision in Lo Ka Chun v. Lo
To." l0 In Lo Ka Chun, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to
the district court for a determination as to the discoverability of
the evidence sought by the requesting non-U.S. party in the
offend the Canadian tribunal. Our decision does not countenance the use of U.S. discovery procedures to evade the limitations placed on domestic pre-trial disclosure by
foreign tribunals." Id.
106. In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); Lo Ka Chun
v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
107. 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989). In Trinidad, the appellant sought to reverse the district court's denial of his motion to quash a
subpoena obtained by the U.S. Department ofJustice at the request of the Minister of
Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago. Id. The United States had sought to obtain the
appellant's bank records as part of a criminal investigation in Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that Section 1782
authorized the judicial assistance sought by the Minister of Legal Affairs even though
there was no pending proceeding in Trinidad and Tobago. Id.
108. In re Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156. The Eleventh Circuit stated that
"[w] hile a district court generally should not decide whether the requested evidence will
be admissible in the foreign court,... the district court must decide whether the evidence
would be discoverablein theforeign country before grantingassistance." Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. (citingJohn Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3rd Cir. 1985);
In re Court of the Comm'r of Patents for Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75, 77
(E.D. Pa. 1980)).
110. Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).

356

FORDHAMINTIERNATIONALLAWJOURNVAL

[Vol. 18:332

home country of litigation."' Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit did
not state any reason for mandating the discoverability require12
ment, but instead cited to its previous decision in Trinidad."
In 1989, the D.C. Circuit appeared to join the Third and
Eleventh circuits by holding that Section 1782 contained an implicit discoverability requirement. 113 In In re Letter of Request from
the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, the court upheld a discovery request by the Crown Prosecution Service of the
United Kingdom to depose a U.S. citizen for use in a British
criminal proceeding." 4 The D.C. Circuit Court upheld the request, in part, because the U.S. citizen could not show that the
procedures used by the district court to obtain the requested evi5
dence were unavailable under British discovery laws."
Although the court did not place the burden on the requesting
party to show that the evidence was discoverable under the laws
of the externaljurisdiction, the court did advocate the view that
evidence may only be obtained under Section 1782 if it is discoverable in the other jurisdiction.
3. In re Application Asta Medica, S.A.: The Strongest
Pronouncement for the Discoverability Requirement
The First Circuit, in In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 6
followed the holdings of the Third and Eleventh Circuits by stating that Section 1782 requires a litigant requesting assistance
from a district court to make a threshold showing, prior to obtaining discovery, that the information sought in the United
111. Id. at 1566.
[W]e hereby remand this cause to the district court for a determination as to
the discoverability of the evidence sought by appellee Lo To. Should the district court find the evidence discoverable under the laws of Hong Kong, the
taking of the testimony and/or production of documents should commence
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... However, if the
court finds that the evidence is not discoverable, the subpoenas duces tecum
are due to be quashed.
Id.
112. Id.
113. In re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United
Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
114. Id. at 687.
115. Id at 693. The court stated that the appellant "cites no statutes, rules, cases,
or other official pronouncements to support his claim that the procedures approved by
the district court's order in this case violate British practices." I.
116. 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
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States would be discoverable in the non-U.S.jurisdiction.' 17 The
First Circuit based its decision on the history, rationale, and vari18
ous policy considerations concerning the statute.
The Asta court first noted that without a discoverability requirement, a U.S. party involved in litigation in another country
with limited pre-trial discovery will be placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-d-vis the non-U.S. party." 9 This disadvantage
would result from the non-U.S. party being able to conduct liberal discovery in the United States, while the U.S. party is confined to the restricted discovery of the otherjurisdiction. 12 ° The
Asta court reasoned that the U.S. Congress did not intend for
Section 1782 to place U.S. litigants in a more detrimental posi2
tion than their opponents when litigating abroad.' '
The second factor, articulated by the Asta court, in favor of
a threshold discoverability requirement was that without the requirement a non-U.S. litigant may use Section 1782 to circumvent the laws and procedures of the jurisdiction where the litigation will take place.' 2 2 Such a case may arise when the information sought under Section 1782 is not available to the litigants in
the non-U.S. jurisdiction due to that jurisdiction's adjudicatory
117. In re Asta Medica S.A., 981 F.2d at 7 (holding that "a litigant requesting assistance under Section 1782 has to show that the information sought in the United States
would be discoverable under foreign law"). The Asta court acknowledged that Congress gave district courts broad discretion under Section 1782 but stated that
"[n]evertheless, limitations imposed by or implicit in the statute must control any exercise of discretion." Id. at 4.
118. See id. ("The court's discretion under section 1782] is limited by the restriction that we find.., to be implicitly required by section 1782, based upon its history,
rationale, and the policy considerations... discussed.").
119. Id.
120. Id. The First Circuit stated that without a discoverability requirement
a United States party involved in litigation in a foreign country with limited
pre-trial discovery will be placed at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis the foreign party. All the foreign party need do is file a request for assistance under
Section 1782 and the floodgates are opened for unlimited discovery while the
United States party is confined to restricted discovery in the foreign jurisdiction.
Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 6. The court stated that such a result "would be contrary to the concept
of fair play embodied in United States discovery rules and the notion that '[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation." Id (citing Societe National Industrielle Aeropastiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for
Southern Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 540 n.25 (1987) (quoting Hickman v. 'Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947))).
122. Id.
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system. 123 If the same information is located within the United
States, however, the litigant may circumvent the other country's

discovery rules by obtaining the information under Section
1782.124 The Asta court reasoned that Section 1782 should not
litigants that each nation creates for
disrupt the balance among
1 25
system.
judicial
own
its
Finally, the court emphasized that upsetting the balance between litigating parties by allowing parties to use Section 1782 to
circumvent another country's laws would create an unwarranted
intrusion into that country's adjudicatory system.' 26 This intrusion would offend such tribunals, undermining the statute's ultimate purpose of encouraging countries to liberalize their discovery rules. 127 Based on these considerations, the court held that a
district court's discretion is 12limited by an implicit discoverability
requirement in the statute.
123. Id. ("The information sought under Section 1782 may not be available in the
foreign jurisdiction due to either procedural restrictions or the substantive law.").
124. Id. The Asta court illustrated such a possible scenario.
[I]n a purely domestic litigation in a foreign jurisdiction with restrictive pretrial discovery procedures, a litigant may request the foreign tribunal to issue
an order compelling the production of information located in the foreign jurisdiction. If such request is denied and the same information is located in the
United States, the litigant may side-step that result by racing here and obtaining the information under Section 1782.
Id.
125. Id. The First Circuit stated that "[i]n amending Section 1782, Congress did
not seek to place itself on a collision course with foreign tribunals and legislatures,
which have carefully chosen the procedures and laws best suited for their concepts of
litigation." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The court noted that "[iun order to avoid offending foreign tribunals,
other courts have established, as a prerequisite to granting a request for assistance
under Section 1782, a threshold showing that the information would be discoverable in
the foreign jurisdiction if located there." Id. (citations omitted). But see South Carolina
Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschapij "De Zeven Provincien" NV, [1987] 1 App. Cas. 24 (H.L.).
In this case the plaintiff sought an injunction from the British courts in order to prevent the defendant from initiating a Section 1782 action requesting depositions of parties located in the United States. Id. The House of Lords refused to issue the injunction, holding that the while procedural differences regarding discovery existed between
the United States and England, the Court would not prevent a party from gathering
information necessary to prove its case. Id. The House of Lords found that an application under Section 1782 to do what could not be done under British law was not an
affront to their sovereignty. Id. The English Court stated that "it could not possibly
have been said that there had been any interference with the English Court's control of
its own process." Id. at 42. For a description and analysis of the case, see DAVID McLEAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDIcIAL AssIsTANcE (1992).
128. Id. at 7. According to the Asta court the primary burden falls upon the appli-
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B. The Second Circuit Creates a Spilt in the Circuits: Application
of Gianoli
In Application of Gianoli,'29 the Second Circuit was presented
with the same issue as in the previous cases: namely, whether
Section 1782 contains a discoverability requirement, either on its
face or by implication.'
Similar to the First Circuit in Asta, the
Gianolicourt based its interpretation of Section 1782 on the statute's legislative history and congressional intent, but reached the
opposite conclusion.'' The Second Circuit held that Section
1782 does not require that the material requested in the district
court be discoverable under the laws of the otherjurisdiction13 2
The Gianoli court began its analysis by reviewing the language of Section 1782.'13 The court stated that since the statute's language is unambiguous in its requirements13 4 and makes
no reference to a discoverability requirement,3 5 the court will
cant who is requesting assistance to show that the information is discoverable under the
non-U.S. law. Id. The court further stated that in cases where the district court may
have problems determining the discoverability of the evidence requested, it may ask the
other country's court for assistance or solicit the assistance of a non-U.S. law expert to
clarify whether the requested information is discoverable or not. Id. at n.7.
129. 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. - 114 S. Ct. 443 (1994) (parties
appointed as guardians of Chilean incompetent sought discovery in U.S. district court
concerning incompetent's assets in United States).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 57-58 (discussing history and purposes of Section 1782).
132. I at 62.
133. Id. at 58. The Second Circuit cited a U.S. Supreme Court decision which
held that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intention of its drafters." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982)).
134. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 58-59. The court listed the requirements of
Section 1782 as follows:
(1) the person from whom discovery is sought must reside or be found in the
district of the district court to which the application is made, (2) the discovery
must be "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal," and
(3) the application must be made "by a foreign or international tribunal" or by
"any interested person."
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
135. Id. at 59.
The language makes no reference whatsoever to a requirement of discoverability under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, the only language in
section 1782 arguably relevant to the issue of whether the district court must
adopt the discovery requirements of the foreign jurisdiction is permissive language, stating that the practice and procedure prescribed by the district court
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not read an extra-statutory barrier to discovery into Section
1782.136 The court advocated a literal reading of Section 1782
and stated that such a reading conforms with the purpose and
legislative history of the statute. 3 7 The Second Circuit reasoned
that if the U.S. Congress actually intended to impose such a
it would
sweeping restriction on the district court's discretion,
38
effect.1
that
to
language
statutory
have included
The Gianoli court then examined the First and Eleventh Circuits' decisions, which read a discoverability requirement into
Section 1782.119 The Second Circuit agreed that the factors
"may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or
the international tribunal."
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
136. Id. ("As we recently made clear.., we are not free to read extra-statutory
barriers to discovery into section 1782.") (citing Malev Hungarian Airlines v. United
Technologies Int'l Corp., 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992)). The Second Circuit in
Gianoli relied on its previous decision in United Technologies. Id. at 59, 61. In United
Technologies, the appellant filed a Section 1782 request for discovery for use in a Hungarian court. United Technologies, 964 F.2d at 98-99. The district court denied the request primarily because the appellant never made a formal request for discoveiy before
the Hungarian court. Id. at 100. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court's grounds for denying the request were improper. Id. The Second Circuit stated
that "[w]e find nothing in the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 which would support a quasiexhaustion requirement of the sort imposed by the district court." Id.
137. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 59.
The Senate Report makes clear that the 1964 amendments were intended to
leave the district courts with wide discretion in granting relief under Section
1782.... The Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on International Rules ofJudicial Procedure expressed a similar viewpoint: " '[Section 1782] is a one-way street. It grants wide assistance to others,
but demands nothing in return. It was deliberately drawn this way.' " Given
that the statutory language is silent and the legislative history indicates that
"[i]n exercising its discretionary power, the court may take into account the
nature and attitudes of the government of the country from which the request
emanates and the character of the proceedings in that country," we find it
difficult to believe that Congress actually intended section 1782 to have an
implicit requirement that any evidence sought in the United States be discoverable under the laws of the foreign country.
Id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. The Second Circuit did state that district courtjudges may find it appropriate in some cases to make a determination of discoverability under the law of the
other jurisdiction as part of their discretionary powers. Id. at 60. However, the statute
contains no threshold requirement of discoverability. Id.
139. Id. at 60. The Second Circuit rejected the idea that the John Deere and In re
South Africa cases held that Section 1782 contains a discoverability requirement. The
court stated:
In John Deere, however, the Third Circuit merely decided that section 1782
does not require (1) that the foreign courts have similar judicial assistance
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cited by the courts mandating a discoverability requirement were
valid concerns to be examined in a Section 1782 proceeding."4
The court, however, held that such considerations were properly
addressed by a district court judge's exercise of discretion and
not by a circuit court instituting a threshold discoverability re4
quirement.'

1

III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
SECTION 1782 DOES NOT CONTAIN A
DISCOVERABILITY REQUIREMENT
In Application of Gianoli,4 2 the Second Circuit correctly held
that Section 1782 does not contain a discoverability requirement. 43 By rejecting the view that Section 1782 requires a party
to make a threshold showing of discoverability, the Second Circuit properly applied principles of statutory interpretation and
appropriately based its decision on Congress' intent to liberalize
judicial assistance in the U.S. district courts.'" Moreover, the
Gianolidecision will not offend other nation's judicial systems in
cases where district courts permit non-U.S. litigants to conduct
procedures, or (2) that the evidence sought be admissible under the rules of
evidence of the foreign jurisdiction. John Deere is not a case about whether
section 1782 requires discoverability, and the court never explicitly states that
such a requirement exists. The Fodens, however, point to the court's language inJohn Deere that on the facts before it the discoverability requirement
has been met, and that '[a] grant of discovery that trenched upon the clearly
established procedures of a foreign tribunal would not be within section
1782.' Nonetheless, we are unconvinced that these general concerns of the
John Deere Court require the reading of an absolute discoverability requirement into section 1782. In... Court of the Comm'r of Patents for South
Africa, the district court did not hold that section 1782 requires a finding of
discoverability be made prior to granting discovery under the statute.... The
court found discoverability to be a useful guide to its exercise of discretion in
the case before it because the Commissioner of Patents was not represented in
the action and the court had grounds to believe that the applicant was attempting to circumvent South African discovery restrictions.
Id. at 60-61 n.3 (citations omitted).
140. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text (describing First Circuit's factors for mandating discoverability requirement).
141. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.Sd 54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1993) cert. denied, - U.S. _
114 S. Ct. 443 (1994).
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text (describing Gianoli decision).
144. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text (describing the court's analy-
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discovery under the federal rules.' 45 Instead, the Second Circuit's interpretation will grant non-U.S. litigants the liberal discovery that the U.S. Congress intended, 14 6 while still enabling
district courts to 47use their discretion to limit discovery under certain conditions.'

A. The Second Circuit ProperlyApplied Principles of Statutory
Interpretation and Appropriately Based Its Decision on
CongressionalIntent
Neither the language of Section 1782 nor its legislative history support the decision that material sought to be discovered
under the statute must also be discoverable under the laws of the
jurisdiction where the litigation will take place.' 48 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the plain meaning of legislation is
conclusive except in certain rare instances when the literal application of a statute will create a result demonstrably at odds with
the intention of the legislature that drafted it.'

49

In this in-

stance, a literal reading of Section 1782 does not require district
courts to mandate a discoverability requirement upon request145. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussing argument that
non-U.S. courts may be offended by allowing discovery under U.S. rules).
146. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (describing congressional intent to liberalize discovery proceedings under Section 1782).
147. See Smit, supra note 3, at 1029 (describing factors that may influence courts to
refuse to render judicial assistance). "The basic rule should be that assistance is rendered unless important considerations affecting concrete and vital American interests
require its refusal." Id. at 1029 n.87.
148. See supra notes 39-77 and accompanying text (describing history and legislative revisions of Section 1782). Smit, supra note 31, at 234 (concluding that discoverability under non-U.S. law is irrelevant). Stahr, supra note 33, at 612 (explaining that
nothing in language or history of statute demands discoverability requirement).
149. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 242. The U.S.
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' " Id. (citation omitted);
Halvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941). In Halvering,the Court stated that
courts in the interpretation of a statute have some scope for adopting a restrictive rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of
that meaning would lead to absurd results, or would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute. But courts are not free to reject that meaning where no
such consequences follow and where [such meaning] appears to be consonant
with the purposes of the Act as declared by Congress and plainly disclosed by
its structure.
Id. at 510-11 (citation omitted); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., - U.S. -, 112
S. Ct. 2589, 2594 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be
the language of the statute ..

").
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ing parties.15 0 Moreover, there is nothing in the wording or
structure of the statute that suggests that a discoverability requirement exists.'51 In fact, the only language pertinent to the
question of whether a district court must examine the discoverability of evidence is permissive language.' 52 The statute states
that the practices and procedures prescribed by the district court
may be in whole or in part the practices and procedures of the
extemaljurisdiction. 153 Therefore, the Second Circuit correctly
limited its interpretation of Section 1782 to the plain meaning of
the statute and avoided placing a judicially-created requirement
54
upon requesting parties in Section 1782 proceedings.'
The legislative history of Section 1782 makes it clear that
the U.S. Congress intended courts in the United States to provide discovery to non-U.S. litigants in a wide variety of circumstances. 155 Congress, however, did not provide strict standards
to guide when a court should grant judicial assistance. 156 Instead, the U.S. Congress determined that the requests for judicial assistance should be left to the court's discretion.1 5 7 By imposing a threshold discoverability requirement, however, a district court's discretion is being unduly narrowed from the
originally broad scope envisioned by Congress."5 " The statute's
legislative history confirms that discoverability is one of a variety
of factors for the district court to consider when exercising its
discretion, but is not a precondition for granting a Section 1782
150. See supra note 9 (quoting Section 1782).
151. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (describing requirements of Section 1782).
152. Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 59 (2d Cir. 1993); see 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
154. See Application of Gianoli,3 F.3d at 61 (holding that no discoverability requirement exists in Section 1782).
155. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing broad discretion
given to district courts under Section 1782); Conway, supra note 13, at 574 (stating that
"[t]he evolution of§ 1782, from its enactment in 1855 through its most recent amendment in 1964, provides a very good indication of Congress' intent regarding the application of the statute").
156. See In re Application of Asta Medica S., 794 F.Supp. 442 (D.C. D. Maine
1992) rev'd, In re Application of Asta Medica S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Congress
has provided no standard to guide the courts' determination of when to grant such
assistance. Instead, it has left this decision wholly discretionary.").
157. Id.
158. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (describing statute's broad
scope of discretion).

364

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURVAL

[Vol. 18:332

request. 159 The Senate Report, which is a principal document
explaining the legislature's conception of Section 1782, states
that a district court in exercising its discretion may consider the
character of the proceedings in the other country. 16 This consideration may include the discovery practices of the country
where the litigation will take place. Since Congress intended-discovery in the external jurisdiction to be only one factor to be
considered by the district court in exercising its discretion, it is
apparent that Congress did not intend the discoverability issue
6
to be a threshold requirement.' '
B. Mandating a Discoverability Requirement Usurps the District
Court's Power ofDiscretion Under Section 1782 and Requires District
Courts to Make Difficult Determinationsof Non-U.S. Discovery Laws
The discoverability requirement forces U.S. district courts to
evaluate other countries' discovery procedures in every Section
1782 action.' 6 2 This places an inordinate burden on district
courts by requiring an evaluation of other nation's evidentiary
and discovery rules. 6 This results in district courts having to
make difficult decisions on how to apply law in which they may
not have expertise." 6 Numerous courts have stated that it is undesirable to have district courts determine the scope of other
159. See supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text (tracing legislative history of Section 1782).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See In re Application of Asta Medica, SA., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding
that showing of discoverability in non-U.S. jurisdiction is threshold requirement).
163. See Smit supranote 31, at 235 ("[T]he drafters realized that making the extension of American assistance on foreign law would open a veritable Pandora's box. They
definitely did not want to have a request for cooperation turn into an unduly expensive
and time-consuming fight about foreign law."). But see In re Application of Asta
Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992). The Asta court stated that "[t]he only burden
that would fiall upon the district court is to make a discovery determination based upon
the submission by the parties. That is hardly an 'onerous' burden." Id. at 7. The Asia
court further stated that in cases where the district court may have trouble in determining whether the information is discoverable in the other jurisdiction, the court may ask
the other nation's court to help it decide whether the information is discoverable or it
could request the assistance of a non-U.S. law expert to clarify the law in question. Id.
at 7 n.7.
164. See Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 12, at 4656 n.115 ("U.S. lawyers and courts
alike have great difficulty mastering and applying the U.S. federal evidentiary rules and
exceptions. It is not unreasonable to assume that similar complexities could exist
under foreign evidentiary codes. Certainly, then, U.S. courts are not in a position to
master and apply foreign codes."); Smit, supra note 31, at 235 (arguing that it would be
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nations' laws.' 65
In In re Request for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District
Criminal Court,'66 the Ninth Circuit stated that in Section 1782
cases courts should not involve themselves in technical issues of
other nations' laws relating to the admissibility of the evidence
sought.'6 7 In John Deere v. Speny Corp.,'68 the Third Circuit
agreed and stated that federal courts should refrain from deciding technical questions of other nations' laws relating to the ad69
missibility of the evidence sought before such tribunals.1
Although neither the South Korea court nor the John Deere court
were addressing the discoverability requirement, the same concerns exist when federal district courts decide questions involving discoverability laws of other nations.
The discoverability requirement also places a heavy burden
on the party requesting discovery to provide evidence on the discoverability of the material in the home country.' Alternatively,
the Gianoli decision allows the discovery to take place subject to
the discretion of the court, leaving the other nation's court to
decide whether and in what capacity to admit the evidence
sought to be discovered.' 7 ' This approach is more compatible
with Congress' broad grant ofjudicial assistance to the U.S. federal courts under Section 1782.
inappropriate for U.S. courts to evaluate different discovery procedures of civil law
countries in requests for assistance).
165. See John Deere Ltd., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (stating that federal courts should not
decide technical questions of other nation's laws); In re Trinidad and Tobago, 117 F.R.D.
177, 178 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("[floreign tribunals are far more competent to decide issues
of their own making than are United States courts. If the situation were reversed, this
court would certainly prefer to interpret United States law rather than have a foreign
tribunal sit in judgment."). The court also stated:
As a matter of law and policy, United States courts should refrain from undertaking an extensive analysis of foreign law in determining whether to honor a
request for judicial assistance, and should confine its [sic] inquiry solely to
whether the evidence requested comports with language of 28 U.S.C. § 1782
....
Our Courts should not become entangled in interpreting foreign law
when deciding whether to grant requests for judicial assistance.
Id.
166. In re Request forJudicial Assistance from the Seoul District Criminal Court,
Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1977).
167. Id. at 723.
168. 754 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir. 1985).
169. Id.
170. See In re Asta Medica S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing threshold
discoverability requirement).
171. See Application of Gianoli,3 F.3d at 60 (evaluating discoverability requirement).
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C. The Second Circuit Opinion Will Not Offend Non-U.S. or
InternationalTribunals
In Asta, the First Circuit reasoned that without a discoverability requirement non-U.S. litigants may use Section 1782 to circumvent external law and procedures. 72 Proponents of the discoverability requirement argue that non-U.S. courts will be offended when U.S. courts grant broad discovery requests,
enabling litigants to bypass their procedures. 17 This bypass will
disrupt the balance between litigants that each nation creates for
its own judicial system.' 74
However, there is no evidence that when district courts
grant Section 1782 requests without imposing a threshold requirement of discoverability, non-U.S. courts are offended. 7 5 It
is important to note that when other national courts provide judicial assistance to U.S. litigants for use in U.S. courts, they ordinarily do so according to their own judicial procedures and customs.' 76 Ironically, there has not been an outcry from U.S.
courts that they are offended by such practices.' 7 7 Instead the
in
framers of the statute acknowledged that differing procedures
78
other nations may lead to divergent discovery procedures.1
172. In re Asta Medica S.A., 981 F.2d at 6.
173. See id. at 7. In Asia, the court stated that allowing Section 1782 requests to
proceed without a discoverability requirement would
lead some nations to conclude that United States courts view their laws and
procedures with contempt. In this manner, the broader goal of the statute stimulating cooperation in international and foreign litigation - would be defeated since foreign jurisdictions would be reluctant to enact policies similar
to Section 1782.
Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 127 (stating that English courts appear not to be offended by
such practices); Greig & Stahr, supra note 5, at 28 ("The South Carolina case thus establishes that, except in extraordinary circumstances, U.K. courts will not enjoin attempts
by U.K. litigants to -obtain evidence from third parties in the United States under
§ 1782.").
176. See Jones, supra note 7, at 515 n.1.
177. See United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting admission
of testimony in U.S. criminal proceeding taken according to procedural rules of other
country which are inconsistent with U.S. rules).
178. See Smit, supra note 31, at 235 n.93. "The drafters were quite aware of the
circumstances that civil law systems generally do not have American type pretrial discovery, and do not compel the production of documentary evidence. They nevertheless
provided for discovery and compulsory production of tangible existence pursuant to
the federal rules." Id/
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CONCLUSION
Section 1782 was amended in an attempt to liberalize U.S.
procedures while accommodating different evidentiary procedures and regulations around the world. It was further meant as
an example to other nations to provide similar assistance in their
judicial tribunals. The current split among the circuits, however,
creates an impediment to consistent and orderly responses to
international litigants seeking discovery in the U.S. federal
courts. Allowing district courts to use their discretion in deciding Section 1782 cases is a better alternative than for some circuit courts to create judicially a statutory barrier to international
judicial assistance. As the boundaries between nations continue
to decrease and transboundary disputes continue to escalate, the
ability of parties to conduct discovery under Section 1782 becomes increasingly important. In order to meet this growing demand the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit's interpretation of Section 1782.

